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Prior Inconsistent Statements: Congress Takes a
Compromising Step Backward in Enacting Rule
801(d)(1)(A)
JOHN M. STALMACK*
INTRODUCTION

Prior inconsistent statements made out of court by a presently
testifying witness have traditionally been considered hearsay' and,
thus, inadmissible as substantive evidence. In attempting to liberalize this and other restrictive rules which keep evidence from the
triers of fact, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence,'
signed into law by President Ford on January 2, 1975. However, the
final form of rule 801(d)(1)(A) is not at all consistent with the general tenor of liberalization. It represents, in essence, a compromising
step backward from the enactment of a more efficient rule
* Associate with the firm of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon in Chicago, Illinois. B.A.,
cum laude, Coe College, 1971; J.D., Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, 1974; LL.M.,
George Washington University National Law Center, 1976. Formerly with the Legislative
Affairs Division of the Department of Justice.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research and editorial assistance of Ms. Patsy J.
Bednarski of the Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal.
Much of the original research included in this article was submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws at the George Washington University
National Law Center. Appreciation is gratefully expressed to Professor David Robinson, Jr.,
of the National Law Center Faculty.
1. Hearsay is defined in FED. R. EVID. 801(c) as a "statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted." This is essentially the definition followed by most of the scholars and
courts. See United States v. Snow, 517 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1975); C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 246, at 584 (2d ed. 1972). A statement is not hearsay, of course, when the issue is whether
the statement had been made. United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134, 1143 (8th Cir. 1975);
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 249, at 588-89 (2d ed. 1972). Some scholars have taken the
position that a witness' prior inconsistent statement is hearsay, but should be excepted from
the hearsay rule. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REv. 177, 192-96 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Morgan]. McCormick, The Turncoat
Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 573, 576 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as McCormick]. Other scholars maintain the position that the prior inconsistent statement of a presently testifying witness should not be considered as hearsay because, since the witness is presently under oath and subject to cross-examination, the purpose
of the hearsay rule has been satisfied. S. LADD & R. CARLSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 210 (1972); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); 3 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1018 (3d ed. 1940); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (2d ed. 1923); Maguire, The
Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741, 767-68 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Maguire].
2. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
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801(d)(1)(A) which would unqualifiedly admit as substantive evidence any prior inconsistent statement of a presently testifying witness.
By examining traditional views, and by contrasting those views
with more liberal ideas propounded by scholars and drafters of
model legislation, this article will demonstrate that the trepidation
of many regarding admission of prior inconsistent statements is
groundless. Critical analysis of the internal inconsistency of rule
801(d)(1) and of the interdependence of rule 801(d)(1)(A) and rule
607 of the Federal Rules of Evidence will further demonstrate that
the present form of rule 801(d)(1)(A) spawns unnecessary confusion
in courtrooms and leads to the emasculation of what could have
been an innovative undertaking to present truth to the triers of fact.
THE CONGRESSIONAL COMPROMISE

Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is the product of many years of careful consideration by both the Judicial Conference of the United States 3 and
the Congress. In its present form, rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence states:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.-A statement is not hearsay if(1) Priorstatement by witness.-The declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent
with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
in a deposition, or. ..
The Judicial Conference, through its Advisory Committee, proposed
three different versions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The latest
version, commonly referred to as the Supreme Court's version, proposed in 1972, contained a rule 801(d)(1)(A) that read as follows:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.-A statement is not hearsay if(1) Priorstatement by witness. The declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent
with his testimony, and. ..
3. A permanent body established by Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
4. Pub. L. No. 93-595, supra note 2.
5. Rules of Evidence For United States Courts and Magistrates, rule 801(d)(1)(A), 56
F.R.D. 183, 293 (1972). For earlier drafts of the proposed federal rules, see 51 F.R.D. 315
(1971) and 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969).
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Congress postponed enactment on March 30, 1973.6 Hearings were
held in both the House 7 and Senate. 8 The House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary proposed a rule
that was essentially the same as existing rule 801(d)(1)(A). The
Subcommittee's rule said:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.-A statement is not hearsay if(1) Prior statement by witness.-A declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent
with his testimony, and was given under oath and subject to
the penalty of perjury at a trial, or hearing or in a deposition
or before a grand jury, or . . .
The full Committee, disagreeing with its Subcommittee's proposal,
added a requirement that the prior inconsistent statement must
have been made by the witness while subject to cross-examination.10
Despite two attempts on the House floor to amend rule
801(d)(1)(A), the Committee's version of the rule passed on February 6, 1974." The House gave three reasons in justification of its
position." First, its version of rule 801, although restricting in rule
801(d)(1)(A) the type of prior inconsistent statement admissible as
substantive evidence, included no such restrictions in rule
801(d)(1)(C). Therefore, the liberality of admitting the identification of a person made after he was perceived was unaffected. Second, by requiring the prior inconsistent statement of a currently
testifying witness to have been made when that witness was at a
formal proceeding and under oath, the rule eliminated dispute as
to whether the statement actually had been made. Finally, the requirement that there must have been an opportunity for crossexamination at the formal proceeding provided additional assur6. Act of March 5, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 11. The rules would have gone into effect on July 1, 1973.
7. Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
8. Hearingson H. R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings].
9. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 382-83 (Supp.); see id. at 170-71.
10. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973). The effect of the committee's
additional requirement was to eliminate admissibility of grand jury testimony.
11. 120 CONG. REC. H560-63, 70 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974). An amendment by Congressman
Mayne (R. Iowa) would have returned the Committee's version of rule 801(d)(1)(A) to the
Subcommittee's version. An amendment by Congressman Hogan (R. Md.) would have made
the House version of rule 801 (d)(1)(A) identical to the Supreme Court version of that rule.
12. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973).
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ances of the statement's reliability. Thus, the House believed that
its version not only would insure reliability of the prior inconsistent
statement, but also would be consonant with the policy of the Supreme Court's version to counteract the effect of witness intimidation in criminal cases. 3
The Senate, on the other hand, proposed a version of rule
801(d)(1)(A) that was identical to the Supreme Court's version.14
The Senate took the position that the House version's requirements
of prior oath and cross-examination were unnecessary. The Senate
believed that it sufficed for the witness to be presently under oath
and subject to cross-examination, thus providing an adequate opportunity to explain any earlier statements. The Senate remonstrated that of the many recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule,
only one, the former testimony exception, required the out of court
statement to have been made while its declarant was under oath.
Moreover, the Senate indicated that the demeanor of a presently
testifying witness was enough to enable the jury to make a determination of belief in the witness' prior statement. The Senate also
stressed the affirmative advantages of its rule 801(d)(1) (A). Because
the witness had made the prior inconsistent statement closer to the
events in issue, his memory would be fresher, and he would not be
subject to intervening influences. Furthermore, the Senate believed
that its version provided the only realistic method for coping with
5
the turncoat witness.1

In conference, a compromise was reached whereby the Senate's
version was adopted with an amendment designed to insure sufficient reliability of prior inconsistent statements." It is this amendment which constituted a backward step. It rejected the spirit of
total liberality of the Senate/Supreme Court version by requiring
that the prior inconsistent statement be "given under oath subject
to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
in a deposition."
Fortunately, the wording "other proceeding" covers statements
made before a grand jury, 7 and has been read by at least one court
to include sworn statements made in such proceedings as interrogations by immigration officials.' Hence, some increased liberaliza13. Id.
14. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1974).
15. Id.
16. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).
17. Id.
18. United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1976). The words "or other
proceeding" might lead one to suspect that a mere affidavit would suffice to satisfy the
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tion of admitting evidence has been achieved, but the failure to
adopt the more liberal rule proposal was a compromising step backward.
REBUTTAL OF THE MAJORITY POSITION: OATH, DEMEANOR, AND CROSSEXAMINATION

To appreciate the merit of the minority position, exemplified by
the Supreme Court version of rule 801(d)(1) (A), which would admit
out of court prior inconsistent statements of a presently testifying
witness as substantive evidence, one must examine the position of
the majority of jurisdictions which adopt the orthodox view' that
prior inconsistent statements are hearsay and thus inadmissible
except for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness' credibility.20 Three reasons for precluding the use of hearsay have usually
been propounded.2 First, the out of court declarant made the statement when he was not under oath. Second, he did not make the
statement at a time when his demeanor could be observed by the
triers of fact. Third, he made the statement when he was not subject
to cross-examination.
The orthodox position can best be exemplified by the opinion of
Judge Stone in the Minnesota Supreme Court case of State v.
Saporen.22 In Saporen, the defendant was convicted of carnal knowledge and abusing a female child under the age of eighteen. At trial,
the prosecution called a Mr. B. J. Sekerman who testified inconsistently with an unsworn, out of court statement that he gave to a
probation officer who was assisted by a stenographer. The prosecurequirements of the rule; that suspicion, however, is probably incorrect. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & D.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
801(d)(1)[011, at 801-70 (1975).
19. See cases listed in 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Annot.,
133 A.L.R. 1454 (1941). It is interesting to note that some courts, even though recognizing
the position that would allow a witness' prior inconsistent statement to be used as substantive
evidence, have rejected the use of a witness' prior inconsistent statement as substantive
evidence on the grounds of stare decisis. E.g., Comer v. State, 222 Ark. 156, 257 S.W.2d 564
(1953). However, an increasing minority of jurisdictions has been admitting the prior inconsistent statements of a witness as substantive evidence. Patterson v. State, - Ind. -,
324 N.E.2d 482 (1975); State v. Igoe, 206 N.W. 2d 291 (N.D. 1973); State v. Skinner, 110 Ariz.
135, 515 P.2d 880 (1973); Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88 (Alas. 1971); Jett v. Commonwealth,
436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970). See also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); CAL. Evw CODE § 1235; NEy.
REV. STATS. § 51.035(2)(a); 2A N.J. STATS. ANN. § 84A-63(1); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-460(a); N.
MEX. STATS. (1973 Supp.) § 20-4-801(d)(1)(A); 9 UTAH CODE ANN. § 63(1).
20. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
21. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 245, at 581-84 (2d ed. 1972); Maguire, supra note 1, at 74344; Advisory Committee's Introductory Note, The Hearsay Problem to the ProposedFederal
Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, 288-289 (1972).
22. 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939); see Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d
146 (1967). See also United States v. Rainwater, 283 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1960).
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tor thereafter successfully introduced Mr. Sekerman's prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence. Mr. Sekerman, although
admitting that he made the prior statement, also asserted that he
was forced into giving that statement by threats that he would
receive seven years in the reformatory unless he testified adversely
23
to the defendant.
In his opinion, Judge Stone reversed the trial court's allowance of
Mr. Sekerman's prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence because that statement was not given under oath and because
it was not subjected to immediate cross-examination. Judge Stone
had two objections to giving substantive effect to a witness' out of
court inconsistent statement that was made while the witness was
not under oath. First of all, the prior statement's lack of oath also
carried with it a lack of solemnity. Secondly, since Mr. Sekerman's
prior inconsistent statement was not made while he was under oath,
he could not be prosecuted for perjury.2 Judge Stone considered
crucial the fact that Mr. Sekerman's statement had been made at
a time when he was not subject to immediate cross-examination:
The chief merit of cross examination is not that at some future
time it gives the party opponent the right to dissect adverse testimony. Its principal virtue is in its immediate application of the
testing process. Its strokes fall while the iron is hot. False testimony is apt to harden and become unyielding to the blows of truth
in proportion as the witness has opportunity for reconsideration
and influence by the suggestions of others, whose interest may be,
25
and often is, to maintain falsehood rather than truth.
The three reasons propounded by the majority have been rebutted
directly by drafters of model legislation, proponents of unqualifiedly
giving substantive effect to prior consistent statements as well as to
prior inconsistent statements. Illustrative is the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence, proposed in 1942:
Rule 503. Admissibility of Evidence of Hearsay Declaration.Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that
the declarant
(a) . is unavailable as a witness, or
(b) is present and subject to cross-examination.
23. See text accompanying notes 59-64 infra.
24. See text accompanying notes 29-33 infra.
25. 285 N.W. at 901. Professor Morgan attacked Judge Stone's allegation that the witness'
prior inconsistent statement was the statement most likely to be false. Professor Morgan to
the contrary believed that the witness' prior statement was the statement most likely to be
true because the witness had no opportunity either for reconsideration or for baneful influence
by others. Morgan, supra note 1, at 193.
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In its commentary to rule 503, the American Law Institute made its
argument for the liberal admissibility of a witness' prior statement.
The touchstone of its argument was that the declarant of the prior
statement is presently in court, under oath, and subject to the adversary's cross-examination. If the declarant alleges to recall the
relevant matter, the adversary is fully protected, and the jury is in
a favorable position to weigh the declarant's out of court statement
in relation to his present testimony. If the declarant purports to
have no recollection of the relevant matter, the need for the evidence
is just as great as if the declarant were unavailable."5 In either situation, the drafters of the Model Code of Evidence believed, both the
adversary and the jury would be in an advantageous position to
evaluate the evidence because the witness who made the prior statement is presently subject to cross-examination. The adversary and
the jury, therefore, would not have to rely solely upon an extrinsic
witness who could report the present witness' declaration; they
would have both witnesses before them and could choose to believe
either or neither of them.
Rule 503(b) of the Model Code of Evidence was adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
when they proposed rule 63(1) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.2
26. It should be noted that both Model Code of Evidence 503(b) and Uniform Rule of
Evidence 63(1) not only encompass the hearsay exception for past recollection recorded, but
actually go further than that well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule. COMMENT, MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE 503(b); COMMENT, UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(l); Baker, The Right to
Confrontation, The Hearsay Rules and Due Process-A Proposal for Determining When
Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529, 554 n.88 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Baker]; McCormick, Hearsay, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 620, 622 (1956). The past recollection recorded exception requires thwt the witness must have recorded the relevant matter
while the matter was recent in his or her mind; rules 503(b) and 63(1) make no such requirement. Whereas the past recollection recorded exception requires that the judge make a determination that the witness, who presently alleges a memory loss must have once had perception of the relevant matter, rules 503(b) and 63(1) make no such requirement. Rules 503(b)
and 63(I) operate even when the witness testifies that he or she never had any relevant
knowledge of the matter or has no recollection of the matter, and never made any statement
with reference to it. Since the Federal Rules of Evidence in rule 803(5) contains a hearsay
exception for past recollection recorded, it may be argued that rules 801(d)(1)(A) and 803(5)
are mutually exclusive. Therefore, if the witness alleges a lack of recollection both as to having
made the prior inconsistent statement and as to its underlying event, unless that statement
qualified as an 803(5) exception, its admissibility would be barred. However, the better
argument is that rules 801(d)(1)(A) and 803(5) are overlapping. See note 74 infra.
27. Rule 63(1) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence states:
Rule 63. Hearsay Evidence Excluded-Exceptions. Evidence of a statement which
is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the
truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissible except:
(1) Previous Statements of Persons Present and Subject to Cross
Examination. A statement previously made by a person who is present at
the hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to the state-
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In their comment, the Commissioners stated that their reason for
the adoption was that after "sentiment is laid aside there is little
basis for objection to this enlightened modification of the rule
against hearsay."2
Necessity for an Oath
The majority emphasizes the requirement of oath because the
oath serves a two-fold purpose. 9 One purpose is to insure that any
statement made by the declarant is made with proper circumspection; the other purpose is to impress upon the declarant that he may
possibly subject himself to the penalty of perjury. These two traditional safeguards of the oath are not valid reasons for prohibiting the
use of a prior inconsistent statement of a presently testifying witness
as substantive evidence. Whatever religious or ceremonial significance that the oath might have had at one time, it is doubtful that
the oath maintains so significant an impact in modem times." Of
all the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, only the exception
as to former testimony requires that the hearsay statement must
have been given when the declarant was under oath. 3 Although the
witness was not under oath when he gave the prior inconsistent
statement, he is presently under oath and, therefore, has a present
duty to furnish the complete truth. 2 Finally, situations of witnesses
making prior statements that were intentionally false would occur
in the minority of cases so that the "disadvantages of admitting a
few more such statements would be outweighed by the advantage
of admitting valuable evidence which is presently excluded." 33
ment and its subject matter, provided the statement would be admissible if
made by declarant while testifying as a witness.
28. COMMENT, UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(l).
29. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
800[01], at 800-10 (1975); C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 245, at 582 (2d ed. 1972); 1973 Hearings,supra note 7, at 128 (Supp.)
(position paper of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America).
30. Reutlinger, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Presently Inconsistent Doctrine, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 361, 363-364 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Reutlinger].
31. 1974 Hearings,supra note 8, at 65 (statement submitted by the Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure and the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence of the
Judicial Conference of the United States); McCormick, supra note 1, at 576; see FED. R. EvID.
804(b)(1).
32. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 295 (Supp.) (letter from Judge Albert B. Maris,
Chairman, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States).
33. Beaver & Biggs, Attending Witnesses' Prior Declarations as Evidence: Theory vs.
Reality, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 309, 323-24 n.59 (1970), citing 1963 N.J. SuP. CT. COMM. ON EVIDENCE
REP. 130-37 [hereinafter cited as Beaver & Biggs].
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The Demeanor of the Witness
The majority position has emphasized that as to a prior inconsistent statement, the critical observable event is the demeanor of the
witness at the exact time that he made the prior inconsistent statement. 4 However, in the words of Dean Wigmore, demeanor is nothing more than a "secondary and dispensable element." Indeed, it
is difficult to dispute Judge Hand's often quoted remark in DiCarlo
v. United States3 that when the triers of fact decide that the truth
is not that to which the witness is presently testifying, but rather
that which he said at a previous time, they are still making the
decision based on what they see and hear in court.
The Opportunity for Cross-Examination
The most analytically troublesome position of the majority to
contest is that a witness' prior inconsistent statement should not be
given substantive effect because that statement was made at a time
when its declarant was not subject to immediate crossexamination.3 7 In California v. Green the Supreme Court refused
to accept the California Supreme Court's opinion that a subsequent
cross-examination could never serve as a "constitutionally adequate
substitute" for contemporaneous cross-examination .3
In order to fully understand the significance of cross-examining a
witness who has made a prior inconsistent statement, two key problems surrounding the situation of prior inconsistent statements
must be explored: What is an inconsistent statement? When is a
presently testifying witness subject to cross-examination?
34. Reutlinger, supra note 30, at 375-78; Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the
Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRtM. L. BULL. 99, 117 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Graham].
35. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1399 (3d ed. 1940).
36. 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925).
37. People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968); Ruhala v.
Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967); State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898
(1939); 1974 Hearings, supra note 8, at 64-65 (statement submitted by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence
of the Judicial Conference of the United States).
38. 399 U.S. 149 (1970), rev'g 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1969). For
an interesting case that rejected the argument that a witness' prior inconsistent statements
are constitutionally required, see People v. Gant, 58 Ill. 2d 178, 317 N.E.2d 564 (1974).
39. 399 U.S. at 158-159. It is also noteworthy that the Court emphasized that the confrontation clause was not exactly the same concept as the evidentiary rule against hearsay. Id.
at 155. For an overview of the various theories of cross-examination as they relate to the
constitutional requirements of confrontation and due process see Natali, Green, Dutton, &
Chambers, Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 Ru'.-CAM. L.J. 43 (1975); Baker, supra note
26, at 529-40; Graham, supra note 34, at 117; Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth
Amendment, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 76 (1971).
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Before a trial court is willing to admit a prior inconsistent statement for either impeachment or as substantive evidence, the court
must determine whether the prior statement is inconsistent." Generally, inconsistency is determined by the whole impression or effect
of what has been said or done."' Thus, the inconsistency can be any
material variance between the present testimony and the previous
statement. 2 The type of inconsistency can be two contradictory
statements," two contrary statements,"4 or an inconsistent position.45 Inconsistent positions may take the following forms: a witness
testifies to a specific factual situation and impeachment is predicated upon a prior inconsistent opinion;" a witness omits a fact that
naturally would have been included; such omission, amounting to
40. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975); People v. Graham, 386 Mich. 452,
192 N.W. 2d 255, 258 (1971). See also FED. R. EVID. 104.
41. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1040 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
42. Morgan v. Washington Trust Company, 105 R.I. 13, 249 A.2d 48, 54 (1969); Commonwealth v. West, 312 Mass. 438, 45 N.E.2d 260, 262 (1942); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 34, at
68 (2d ed. 1972); see Subecz v. Curtis, 483 F.2d 263, 266-67 (1st Cir. 1973) (need to show
inconsistency was greater where a party was examining her own witness; fear was that the
jury would use the inconsistent statement substantively).
43. A contradiction, as defined in WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1950), is a proposition so related to a second proposition that it is impossible for both to be
true or both to be false. Thus, if one proposition is true, then the other proposition has to be
false. Some cases, indicated by the entire record, have produced contradictory statements by
a witness. E.g., Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967). For example, assume
that the issue is whether the man or woman in the vehicle drove the vehicle. The only
evidence as to that issue is a witness who has given two different accounts. Out of court, the
witness has said that the man drove; whereas, in court, the witness said that the woman*
drove. Finally, assume that the civil plaintiff, who must prove that the man drove, calls the
witness to the stand. Notwithstanding any contentions about the law concerning burdens of
proof, a court which allows the out of court statement in the example only for its impeaching
value (thereby causing the plaintiffs case to fail even though the jury could have accepted
the truth of the out of court statement) must also face the charge that it is permitting a logical
absurdity. See note 86 infra.
44. Contrary propositions, as defined in WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1950), are propositions so related that although both can not be true, both can be false.
Suppose a witness has testified in court that X did the event in question, but has also made
an out of court statement that X did not do the event. Suppose further that the record also
shows the possibility that Y might have done the event. Although a jury in this situation is
logically free to reject both versions of the witness' account of the event, most likely the jury
will believe one of the witness' versions to be true. Therefore, the jury's belief is the crucial
factor. If it believes one of the contrary statements to be true, it must also believe that the
other statement is false. See text accompanying note 84 infra.
45. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 607[06], at 607-63-68 (1975).
It should also be noted that rule 801(d)(1)(A) states in part: "[Aind the statement is (A)
inconsistent with his testimony. . . .FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
46. Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 239, 254-55 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Ladd]; Grady, The Admissibility of a Prior
Statement of Opinion for Purposes of Impeachment, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 224 (1956). However,
impeachment by a prior inconsistent opinion was not allowed in State v. Jackson, 412 S.W.2d
428, 434-35 (Mo. 1967) and Shaw v. Johnston, 485 P.2d 518, 520 (Colo. App. 1971).
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an assertion of the non-existence of that fact, is used to impeach the
testimony of the witness who has previously asserted the fact's existence;"7 inconsistency implied by silence;48 and a denial of recollection.49
In cases where a court is willing to admit a prior inconsistent
statement as substantive evidence, not only must there be an inconsistency, but also there must be a witness who is presently subject
to cross-examination concerning his prior inconsistent statement. 5°
If the situation is such that the witness, while on the stand, admits
that his prior inconsistent statement is true, there is no problem
because the triers of fact have two conflicting statements of equal
force to weigh as evidence." Accordingly, where the witness has
admitted the truth of his prior inconsistent statement, the courts
have usually granted substantive effect to that statement. 2 More
perplexing, however, are the following situations: where the witness
has affirmed the prior statement but has either denied the underlying fact or has claimed a lack of recollection as to that underlying
47. People v. Bornholdt, 33 N.Y.2d 75, 350 N.Y.S.2d 369, 379-80 (1973); State v. Provet,
133 N.. Super. 432, 337 A.2d 374 (1975); People v. Burchette, 4 Il. App. 3d 734, 281 N.E.2d
773, 775 (1972).
48. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1043 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). But see Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S.
Ct. 2240 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975). In Hale, the Court, exercising
its supervisory authority over lower federal courts, held that, under the circumstances of the
case, the witness's silence was not so clearly inconsistent with his trial testimony as to have
warranted admission into evidence that silence as a prior inconsistent statement. Furthermore, the Court held that because the witness's silence during police interrogation, especially
after the witness received his Miranda warnings to the right to remain silent, lacked significant probative value, any reference to his silence carried with it an intolerably prejudicial
impact. In Doyle it was held unconstitutional to impeach a witness by silence after his
Miranda rights were exercised. See Comment, Doyle v. Ohio: Use of Defendant's Silence for
Impeachment at Trial, 8 Lov. CHI. L.J. 438, 464 (1977).
49. Allowed: United States v. Washabaugh, 442 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1170 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970) (also allowing
the prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence); People v. Bush, 29 Ill. 2d 367, 194
N.E.2d 308, 312 (1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1727 (Burns 1946). See also 3A J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 904(8), 1043 (Chadboum rev. 1970). Not allowed: French v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. 254 Iowa 1044, 120 N.W. 2d 476, 480 (1963). It should also be noted that a
witness' refusal to testify does not suffice for inconsistency. Mays v. State, 495 S.W.2d 833
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1972); cf. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). See also FED. R. EvID.
804(a) (3).
50. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(1)(A). See generally
Comment, Substantive Use of Witness' PriorInconsistent Statement Does Not Violate the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 2 Loy. CHI. L.J. 238 (1971).
51. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 801(d)(1)(A)[02], at 801-77-78
(1975).
52. United States v. Carter, 417 F.2d 229, 230-31 (3rd Cir. 1969); Slade v. United States,
267 F.2d 834, 838-39 (5th Cir. 1959); Commonwealth v. Fiore, 364 Mass. 819, 308 N.E. 2d
902, 906 (1974); People v. Couch, 49 Mich. App. 69, 211 N.W.2d 250, 253 (1973).
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fact;5" where the witness disavows the prior statement and has either
denied the underlying fact or professes a lack of recollection as to
that underlying fact;" or where the witness denies all personal
knowledge of the event. 5 The crucial issue in each of the aforementioned contexts of prior inconsistent statements is whether the witness has been effectively subjected to cross-examination.
One may be led to believe that a witness cannot be effectively
cross-examined when he has affirmed his statement, but has either
denied the underlying fact or claimed a lack of recollection as to that
underlying fact. The belief is especially attractive when either the
prosecution or civil plaintiff is permitted to impeach his own witness
and thereafter to introduce any prior inconsistent statements of that
witness as substantive evidence." From the viewpoint of the defendant, however, the situation is far from being hopeless. 7 The witness can be effectively examined. First, where the witness admits
the statement but denies the underlying fact, the defendant can
elicit from the prosecutorial or civil plaintiff's witness the reason
why he made the statement. Any number of causes could have
prompted the witness to make the statement. The statement could
have been a result of faulty perception or undue haste in explaining
the event. 5 The witness may have been intimidated into giving the
53. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
801(d)(1)(A)[03];
801(d)(1)(A)[04] (1975).
54. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
801(d)(1)(A)[051;
801(d)(1)(A)106] (1975).
55. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
801(d)(1)(A)[08] (1975). It
should be noted that this situation is not really a situation involving prior inconsistent
statements but a situation involving the issue of whether the witness had personal knowledge
of the underlying event. See FED. R. EvID. 602, 104.
56. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968);
Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967); State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285
N.W. 898 (1939).
57. It is difficult to agree with such opinions as Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 116, 150
N.W.2d 146, 156 (1967) and People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 427 n.6, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 782 (1969), rev'd sub nom., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), which insist that
it is a futile exercise for the defendant to cross-examine a prosecutorial or plaintiff's witness
who is presently testifying favorably to the defendant. See 399 U.S. at 160. Although it might
be contended that the belated cross-examination of the defendant is robbed of its "triumphal
flourish," the defendant's cross-examination is no less effective. Id.; 1974 Hearings, supra
note 8, at 65 (statement submitted by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure and the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence of the Judicial Conference of
the United States). In no event should the effect of drama override the search for truth.
Furthermore, the defendant's cross-examination of the recreant witness as to the prior statement is not really a true cross-examination at all, but rather a re-direct. REDDEN & SALTZBURG,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, Rule 611, at 199 (1975); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 26,
at 53 (2d ed. 1972); FED. R. EVID. 611(c).
58. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 160 (1970).
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statement.59 Also, there are the possibilities that vindictiveness, interest, or prejudice may have caused the witness to make the statement.6 0 In addition, the witness can be generally examined as to
matters of perception, memory, narration, sincerity, and integrity."'
When, however, the witness has admitted the prior statement,
but has professed a lack of recollection as to the underlying event,
a slightly different course of action must be pursued by the examiner. In Californiav. Green, 2 the witness did admit having made a
prior statement but professed a lack of recollection as to the underlying event. The Court, after deciding that the confrontation clause
of the sixth amendment was not violated by admitting the prior
statement, remanded the case to the California Supreme Court to
decide whether the witness' lapse of memory so affected the defendant's right to cross-examine as to make a critical difference in the
application of the constitutional right to confrontation. 3 On remand, the California Supreme Court decided that the witness was
properly subjected to cross-examination because the inconsistency
could have been explained despite the defense's failure to have elicited any such explanation.64 The court said that the trial court could
have chosen to disbelieve the witness' claim of lack of recollection.
The trial court could have considered such factors as the reasons
for the lack of recollection, the time duration between the event and
the testimony, and the likelihood of the witness' forgetting the
particular fact.65 In the situation where the witness admits the prior
statement but asserts a lack of recollection of the underlying event,
the examiner, although denied the opportunity to examine the witness as to that underlying event, may still conduct a general cross59. See, e.g., State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939).
60. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968).
61. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
801(d)(1)(A)[03], at 801-79
(1975); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 47, at 98 (2d ed. 1972); Comment, Substantive Use of
Extrajudicial Statements of Witnesses Under the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 U.
RICH. L. REv. 110, 126 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Extrajudicial Statements]. See generally
REDFIELD, CROSS EXAMINATION AND THE WITNESS (1963).
62. 399 U.S. 149, 168-69 (1970).
63. Id. The Court, in Green, left open the issue whether the substantive admission of a
prior statement made by a presently testifying witness who alleges no recollection of having
made the statement or the statement's underlying fact violates the defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. Judge Weinstein is of the opinion that it would probably violate
the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation to substantively admit the presently
testifying witness' prior statement when the witness alleges a complete lack of recollection. 4
J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
801(d)(1)(A)[07], at 801-97 (1975). The
Fourth Circuit, however, has held to the contrary. See text accompanying notes 67-74 infra.
64. People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 98, 479 P.2d 998, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1971).
65. Id. at 1002; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801 (d)(1)(A)[041,
at 801-83 (1975).
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examination of the witness."
The most difficult situation in which to assess whether a witness
has been properly subjected to cross-examination is one in which the
witness has disavowed his prior statement, and has either denied
the underlying fact or declared a lack of recollection as to that
underlying fact. Some commentators have expressed the opinion
that in such a situation, "cross-examination does not hold much
promise as a satisfactory testing procedure." 7 Nevertheless, the
California Supreme Court in People v. Romo,1" and the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Payne," have disagreed with those commentators. In Romo, after claiming no recollection as to the underlying
event because of his intoxication at the time of the event, the witness also professed no recollection of having made a prior statement
to a police officer." The police officer, who took a tape recorded
statement from the witness, appeared in court and played the recording. The trial court held that the statement was properly admitted for impeachment and instructed the jury accordingly. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California said that the prior inconsistent statement of the witness could have been admitted as substantive evidence as well as for impeachment.' In Payne, the Fourth
Circuit held admissible as substantive evidence a prior inconsistent
statement in the face of both a constitutional and an evidentiary
attack, even when it determined that the witness was not feigning
a loss of memory.72 In this situation, as in the situation when the
witness admits having made the statement but professes a lack of
recollection as to the underlying event, the witness is still subject
to a general cross-examination.73 Furthermore, the person to whom
the disavowed statement was made can be generally cross-examined
and, quite possibly, can be cross-examined as to the underlying
event.74
66. Cf. Kinsey v. State, 49 Ariz. 201, 65 P.2d 1141, 1150 (1937); see note 61 supra.
67. Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 UCLA L. REv. 43, 53 (1954); Extrajudicial Statements, supra note 61, at 119.
68. 14 Cal. 3d 189, 534 P.2d 1015, 121 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1975).
69. 492 F.2d 449 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974); Case Note, 27 S.C.L. REV.
257 (1975).
70. 534 P.2d at 1018.
71. Id. at 1019.
72. 492 F.2d at 450-51.
73. See note 61 supra.
74. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I 801(d)(1)(A)[05], at 801-88-89
(1975). See also FED. R. EvID. 613(b). Judge Weinstein has expressed the opinion that where
the witness has professed a lack of recollection as to both having made the prior statement
and its underlying fact, the statement will probably be excluded unless it can qualify as a
former testimony (FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(3),(b)(1)) or some other exception to the hearsay rule
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BENEFITS OF ADMITTING PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AS
SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE

The liberal Supreme Court version of rule 801(d)(1)(A) would
have had a beneficial impact on the search for truth. Some specific
benefits would be the assurance of trustworthiness, the protection
against the recreant witness, and the elimination of confusing jury
instructions.
When jurisdictions allow exceptions to the hearsay rule, those
exceptions have usually been permitted on the premise that the
proffered evidence has satisfied both a guarantee of trustworthiness
and a requirement of necessity." In the case of a witness' prior
inconsistent statement, where the whole purpose of the hearsay rule
has already been satisfied,7" the additional guarantees of trustworthiness and necessity further mandate that such statements be
given substantive effect. In the opinion of Dean McCormick, the
prior inconsistent statements of a witness are not merely trustworthy, but are actually superior in trustworthiness to any testimony
given by the witness in court." The basis of Dean McCormick's
opinion is the valid assumption that "memory hinges upon recency." 5 Moreover, the ability to use the prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence will protect a party against those
witnesses who have turned against him because they have been
wrongly influenced or have had improper pressures placed upon
them.7" The ability to protect oneself against the turncoat witness
who has been bribed or intimidated, by using that witness' prior
(e.g.,

FED.

R. EVID. 803(1), (2), (5), (24), 804(b)(5)). 4 J.

WEINSTEIN

& D.

BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S

801(d)(1)(A)[06], at 801-97 (1975). With due deference to Judge Weinstein, it
must be noted that two federal circuits (albeit prior to the effective date of the Federal Rules
of Evidence) have used rules 801(d)(1)(A) and 804(a)(3), (b)(1) interchangably. United States
v. Collins, 478 F.2d 837, rehearingdenied en banc, 480 F.2d 925 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1010 (1973); McDonnell v. United States, 472 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1973). Therefore, rather
than being mutually exclusive, rules 801(d)(1)(A) and 804(a)(3), (b)(1) are probably overlapping. See also People v. Romo, 14 Cal. 3d 189, 534 P.2d 1015, 121 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1975);
United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974); text
accompanying note 122 infra.
75. Reutlinger, supra note 30, at 366; Advisory Committee's Introductory Note, The Hearsay Problem to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, 288-90 (1972).
76. 399 U.S. at 155; 3A J. WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
77. McCormick, supra note 1, at 577.
78. Id. at 577-78 n.12-14; see Beaver & Biggs, supra note 33, at 334; Stewart, Perception,
Memory and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 8-22; ExtrajudicialStatements, supra note 61, at 126.
79. McCormick, supra note 1, at 577. Extrajudicial Statements, supra note 61, at 120;
1974 Hearings,supra note 8, at 51 (testimony of Professor Edward W. Cleary, reporter to the
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, Judicial Conference of the United States). This
assumption also presumes that a party may impeach his or her own witness. See text accompanying notes 109-121 infra.
EVIDENCE
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inconsistent statements as substantive evidence is buttressed,
therefore, not only by the safeguard of trustworthiness, but also by
the safeguard of necessity."
The majority's orthodox position, which does not allow the prior
inconsistent statement of a witness to be used substantively, does
not allow the prior inconsistent statement to be used to impeach the
credibility of the witness."' When a party seeks to use a prior inconsistent statement to impeach a witness' credibility, the opposing
party is entitled to a jury instruction limiting the prior inconsistent
statement to its use as impeachment. 2 Many eminent scholars and
judges have expressed a general dislike for the practice of instructing a jury to consider evidence for its limited use. 3 The use of a
limiting instruction reaches the pinnacle of exasperation when the
jury is told to consider a witness' prior inconsistent statement for
only its impeachment value. As Dean Ladd once said:
Indeed, as a practical matter it is hard to conceive of the situation
in which a jury would draw such fine lines as to say, "we regard
the statement made out of court as a true statement and therefore
will disregard the contradictory testimony given in court, but we
will not consider the statement made out of court as evidence upon
which we will base our verdict although we believe it to be true."
If the jury considers the statement in court false and the extrajudicial statement true, it is expecting a good deal of jurors not
experienced in such fine distinctions simply to reject all of the
evidence. 4
Consequently, Dean Ladd's principle requiring that a prior
inconsistent statement, if used at all, be used for all purposes represents the soundest position."
80. Contra, Reutlinger, supra note 30, at 366. Professor Reutlinger is of the opinion that
the examiner's use of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence is not a necessity
but merely a desirability.
81. See note 20 supra.
82. United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Kemp, 504 F.2d
421 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 160 U.S. App. D.C. 57 (D.C. Cir.
1973). But cf. United States v. Hill, 481 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973)
(holding that it was not plain error for the trial court not to have given a limiting instruction
where defense counsel failed to request such instruction).
83. See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933) (Cardozo, J.); United States v. De
Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964) (Friendly, J.); McCormick, supra note 1, at 580. See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (Brennan,
J.) (inefficacy of the limiting instruction to cure a constitutional defect). But see FED. R. Evm.
105.
84. S. LADD & R. CARISON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 820 (1972).
85. Ladd, supra note 46, at 250. A limiting instruction to consider the prior inconsistent
statement only for impeachment is all the more absurd when one also considers the so-called
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POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF ADMITTING PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE

The principle that a witness' prior inconsistent statement is admissible only for impeachment becomes especially significant where
the party charged with the burden of producing evidence relies upon
the inconsistent statement as the only material evidence in support
of his case. The jurisdictions following the impeachment only rule
have held that when the only evidence produced by the party
charged with the burden of producing evidence is a witness' prior
inconsistent statement, the party's case fails. " Many have feared
that a change in position allowing the prior inconsistent statement
to be given substantive effect would probably also require that a
prior inconsistent statement be sufficient to sustain a party's case."
To say that a prior inconsistent statement alone would in all instances be enough to sustain a party's case is a gross overstatement. This
is not an issue that is reductive to a hard and fast rule, but one that
should depend upon the circumstances of each case."
Those who fear that a prior inconsistent statement given substantive effect would, in all cases, be enough to sustain a party's burdens
of proof fail to recognize the essential difference between admissibility and sufficiency.89 Admissibility of evidence should never be pred"collateral rule." The "collateral rule", as it relates to prior inconsistent statements, precludes a party from introducing extrinsic evidence of the witness' prior inconsistent statement
unless that statement is relevant to a material, consequential issue of the case. Ewing v.
United States, 135 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 776 (1943); 3 J. WEINSTEIN
& D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EvIDENCE 607[06], at 607-69-70 (1975); C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE
§§ 36, 47 (2d ed. 1972); see United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 401 (2d Cir. 1966) (allowing
impeachment by prior inconsistent statement but not extrinsic evidence as to a collateral
matter). Therefore, the very essence of the collateral rule is that the extrinsic evidence be
worthy of substantive effect even though the limiting instruction mandates that it not be
given such effect.
86. United States v. Tavares, 512 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Neal, 452 F.2d
1085 (10th Cir. 1971); Lerma v. United States, 387 F.2d 187 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
907 (1968).
87. But cf. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
801(d)(1)(A)[01], at
801-76 (1975); Blakey, You Can Say That if You Want-The Redefinition of Hearsay in Rule
801 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 601, 625 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Blakey]; Graham, supra note 34, at 128-33; 1973 Hearings, supra note 30, at 287
(Supp.) (letter from Joseph S. McCarthy, Chairman, Study Committee on Federal Rules of
Evidence of the District of Columbia Bar).
88. 1974 Hearings, supra note 8, at 36 (testimony of Judge Charles W. Joiner, Member, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the
United States).
89. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 98-99 (Supp.) (letter from Professor Edward W.
Cleary, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, Judicial Conference of the
United States); 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1042, at 802 (1964). It should be noted that a general
discussion of distinctions between the standard of persuasion in a civil case (i.e.,
"preponderance of the evidence"; "clear and convincing") and the standard of persuasion in
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icated upon its ability to sustain a case.9 0 If every item of evidence
were required to be sufficient to sustain a case before it could be
admitted, few items would ever be admitted. 1 A witness' prior inconsistent statement, if admitted as substantive evidence, would in
3
many cases be direct evidence. 92 Unlike the system of Roman law,
which attached numerical values to witnesses, the Anglo-American
system has avoided mathematical concepts as to the sufficiency of
evidence." Even as to a criminal case, therefore, the general rule is
that the direct testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support
a verdict. 5
The enigma of the single, direct, prior inconsistent statement,
however, can be solved by a requirement of corroboration. But
rather than requiring corroboration as a prerequisite to admissibility, prior inconsistent statements should be admitted in every case.
Corroboration, then, should be a determining factor considered by
a criminal case (i.e., "beyond a reasonable doubt") is beyond the scope of this article. See
generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 338, 339, 340, 341 (2d ed. 1972). Whether the federal
courts will make distinctions in standards of persuasion when they deal with prior inconsistent statements is a matter of pure speculation at this time. As to whether there should be
different standards of evidence in criminal and civil trials, see Chadbourn, Bentham and
the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75
HARV. L. REV. 932, 950-51 (1962); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE $ 131 (3d ed. 1940).
90. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) which states in part:
A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Although the requirement of corroboration in rule 804(b)(3) is a precondition to the admissibility of evidence under the rule [see P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE 131 (1973)], it is also a fair assumption that the requirement of corroboration
was included to make any such statement admitted sufficient, when standing alone, to
support a verdict.
91. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 98-99 (Supp.) (letter from Professor Edward W.
Cleary, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, Judicial Conference of the
United States).
92. Graham, supra note 34, at 131; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 338 (2d ed. 1972).
93. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2032 (3d ed. 1940); H. JoLowicz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 462 (1954); Graham, supra note 34, at 128.
94. Hessler v. Suburban Propane Natural Gas Company of Pa., 402 Pa. 128, 166 A.2d 880,
883 (1961); 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1022 (1964).
95. United States v. Jones, 486 F.2d 476, 479 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Terry, 362
F.2d 914, 916 (6th Cir. 1966); Proffit v. United States,.316 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1963); Carter
v. People, 175 Colo. 497, 488 P.2d 558 (1971); State v. Newcomb, 146 Me. 173, 78 A.2d 787,
789 (1951). However, the testimony of a single witness is not sufficient to support a verdict
when such testimony is contradictory to known physical facts. Ford Motor Company v.
Arguello, 382 P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo. 1963). But mere contradictions by other witnesses are not
enough to upset the sufficiency of testimony supplied by a single witness. Geter v. State 219
Ga. 125, 132 S.E.2d 30, 36 (1963). But see Letner v. State, 512 S.W.2d 643, 649 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1974) (one witness' testimony not sufficient if it is "not of a cogent and conclusive
nature, and if it is so indefinite, contradictory or unreliable that it would be unsafe to rest a
conviction thereon").
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the trial court when passing upon the sufficiency of that single,
direct, prior inconsistent statement to withstand a motion for a
directed verdict, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a judgment of acquittal. 6
The requirement of corroboration is familiar to many facets of
American law. It has been required in regard to certain statements
to insure sufficiency to support a conviction. 7 In addition, judges,
in certain situations, instruct the jury to accept any uncorroborated
evidence with caution." Therefore, a trial court in a directed verdict
situation, or an appellate court on review, could determine whether
a prior inconsistent statement were properly corroborated either as
to its having been made or as to its surrounding circumstances. 9
Circumstantial evidence has been held to be sufficient to sustain a
verdict, even in a criminal case; 00 therefore, a court could examine
the record for any circumstantial or direct evidence presented in
96. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50; FED. R. CRIM. P. 29; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 95
(2d ed. 1970). It should also be noted that the Study Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence for the District of Columbia Bar proposed that the following sentence be added to
the Advisory Committee's note to rule 801(d)(1): "For purposes of a ruling on the sufficiency
of the evidence to support a criminal or civil issue on motion for directed verdict, N.O.V. or
for judgment of acquittal, prior statements admissible under Rule 801 (d) (1) should be treated
in the same manner as any other form of evidence." 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 287
(Supp.) (letter from Joseph S. McCarthy, Chairman, Study Committee on Federal Rules of
Evidence of the District of Columbia Bar).
97. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1963) (confession must be corroborated by prima facie evidence of the corpus delicti); United States v. Gross, 511 F.2d 910, 915
(3rd Cir. 1975) (as to prosecution under the general perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970),
the uncorroborated oath of one witness is not enough to establish the falsity of the accused's
testimony); United States v. McConney, 329 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1964) (false exculpatory
statements not sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Mann Act); State v. Kasai, 27
Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265, 1266 (1972) (testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated).
98. Cf. United States v. Nolte, 440 F.2d 1124, 1126-27, (5th Cir. 1971); P. ROTHSTEIN,
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 131 (1973).
99. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973), where the Court stated:
The hearsay statements involved in this case were originally made and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance
of their reliability. First, each of McDonald's confessions was made spontaneously
to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred. Second, each one
was corroborated by some other evidence in the case-McDonald's sworn confession, the testimony of an eye-witness to the shooting, the testimony that McDonald
was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting, and proof of his prior ownership
of a .22-caliber revolver and subsequent purchase of a new weapon. The sheer
number of independent confessions provided additional corroboration for
each. ...
100. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, rehearingdenied, 348 U.S. 932 (1954); United
States v. Downen, 496 F.2d 314, 318-19 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974); United
States v. Burrell, 496 F.2d 609 (3rd Cir. 1974). It should be noted that if the prior inconsistent
statement is circumstantial rather than direct, the statement would have to meet the existing
sufficiency standard as to circumstantial evidence.
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support of the prior inconsistent statement to sustain the verdict.','
Moreover, a court should take into consideration the situation where
the prior inconsistent statement has been admitted when the party
charged with the burden of producing evidence has satisfied that
burden and has offered the statement into evidence by way of impeaching his opponent's witness.,0 2 There is no problem with insufficient corroboration because the party charged with the burdens of
proof has already made his case.' 3
In determining whether or not a prior statement has been made,
a court could consider certain factors about the statement itself.
Because the strength of the statement would be derived from the
statement itself rather than from evidence supplementing the statement, the consideration of these factors would not be classical corroboration. However, this judicial method would be superior to the
existing procedure of the Federal Rules of Evidence in its rule
801(d)(1)(A) which admits the statement by means of an inflexible
rule that supposedly assures reliability. A court could consider such
factors as whether the prior inconsistent statement was given under
oath at some kind of formal proceeding' 4 or whether the statement
was written, signed, recorded, or acknowledged by the witness.
When the statement is oral, unsworn, and the witness either denies
making the statement or has no recollection of making the statement, the court could consider the following factors: whether the
statement was given by more than one witness;'0 or whether a witness gave a statement to more than one person or to one person more
than once.' 6 As stated by the Advisory Committee to the Judicial
101. United States v. Lipscomb, 425 F.2d 226, 227 (6th Cir. 1970); see Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1972, cert. denied,
410 U.S. 983 (1973); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). A contention might be raised that no reform need
be made because this result is already accomplished when the jury disregards the limiting
instruction to use the prior inconsistent statement for only impeachment. However, the
contention is not valid because the integrity of the judicial system is at stake. 1973 Hearings,
supra note 7, at 195 (Supp.) (letter from Alan B. Morrison, Public Citizen, Inc.).
102. United States v. Hill, 481 F.2d 929, 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973);
cf. United States v. Thor, 512 F.2d 811, 813 (5th Cir. 1975).
103. 481 F.2d 929, 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973). Furthermore, the
general rule is that after any motion for a directed verdict, the court must consider all the
evidence including any of the defendant's evidence that bolsters the government's case.
United States v. Grizaffi, 471 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Haskell, 327 F.2d
281, 282 n.2 (2nd Cir. 1964).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1976); FED. R. EvID.
80 1(d) (1)(A).
105. See, e.g., Gelhaar v. Wisconsin, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W. 2d 609 (1969), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 929 (1970); People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 411 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Rainwater, 283 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1960).

19771

Prior Inconsistent Statements

Conference, "When the choice is between evidence which is less
than best and no evidence at all, only clear folly would dictate an
across-the-board policy of doing without."' 17
INTERDEPENDENCE OF RULE

801(d)(1)(A)

AND RULE

607

Rule 801(d)(1)(A) must operate in tandem with rule 607, which
allows a party to impeach his own witness.' An analysis of the
relationship between the two rules lends further credence to the
proposition that Congress took a compromising step backward when
enacting rule 801(d)(1)(A) in its present form.
Traditionally, three reasons have been noted in justification of the
1 First, it has been
rule against impeaching one's own witness. 09
argued that a party, by calling a witness, is morally bound by his
testimony."" Second, a party calling a witness vouches for the credibility of that witness."' Third, the rule against impeaching one's
own witness provides protection against a party's coercing a witness
into testifying as desired.' 2
As in the case in other areas of the law where the harshness of a
general rule fosters a series of exceptions to that rule, the rule
against impeaching one's own witness has been avoided by exceptions. For example, a party has been free to introduce other evidence
107. Advisory Committee's Introductory Note, The Hearsay Problem to the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, 289 (1972).
108. Note, Prior Inconsistent Statements and the Rule Against Impeachment of One's
Own Witness: The Proposed Federal Rules, 52 TEXAS L. REv. 1383, 1397-08 (1974).
109. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 38, at 75 (2d ed. 1972); Slough, Impeachment of Witnesses: Common Law Principles and Modern Trends, 34 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as Slough].
110. However, a party has always been able to introduce other evidence contradicting the
facts testified to by his witness. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 38, at 75 n.67 (2d ed. 1972).
111. The "voucher rule" has fallen upon hard times in recent years. The Supreme Court,
in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 296, 302 (1973), although not holding the "voucher
rule" to be constitutionally inadequate in every case, did express a general dislike for the rule.
See also Maness v. Wainwright, 512 F.2d 88, 91-92 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that Chambers
did not declare that a state's use of the "voucher rule" was constitutionally impermissible).
Furthermore, with the possible exceptions of expert witnesses or those witnesses whom a
party is required by law to call, it cannot be said that a party has a free choice in calling
witnesses. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 38, at 75 (2d ed. 1972).
112. The theory, however, applies more to an attack upon a witness' character than it does
to an impeachment by prior inconsistent statement. Furthermore, it should be noted that it
is tactically unwise to launch an attack on the character of a witness whom a party calls.
Comment, Witnesses Under Article VI of the ProposedFederal Rules of Evidence, 15 WAYNE
L. REV. 1236, 1264 (1969). But see United States v. Rothman, 463 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 956 (1972) (allowing the government, on its direct exam, to elicit
information that was damaging to the witness' character on the ground that it prevented "the
defense from creating a misleading impression, or the jurors from thinking that the Government is seeking to keep something from the jury").
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contradicting the facts to which his witness has testified."' A party
has been able to refresh the recollection of a witness who has failed
to remember certain facts or made contrary or contradictory statements."' On occasion, the trial court has, itself, called a witness
when neither party was willing to vouch for that witness' veracity." 5
Where a party is faced with a hostile witness or calls an adverse
party to the witness stand, many jurisdictions have relaxed the
rule." In almost all of the federal circuits, prior to the enactment
of rule 607, impeachment of a party's witness by a prior inconsistent
statement was allowed when the dual requirements of surprise and
affirmative damage were met."' Affirmative damage was defined as
something more than a mere failure to give helpful evidence to the
impeaching party. Responses by the witness such as "I don't know,"
"I am not sure," or "I don't remember" did not constitute affirmative damage." ' The affirmative damage rule protected a party
against his opponent's placing before the jury, under the guise of
impeachment, evidence to which the jury would have improperly
given substantive effect." 9 However, when damage occurred, there
was a definite need for the impeaching party to have "neutralized"
20
the harmful testimony.'
The extreme closeness of the relationship between rule 607 and
rule 801(d)(1)(A) can be effectively demonstrated by the use of a
113. See note 110 supra.
114. Lerma v. United States, 387 F.2d 187 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 907 (1968);
Gaines v. United States, 349 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1965). However, any refreshment of a
witness' recollection is not evidence, and, therefore, can not be read before the jury. United
States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1971). See also FED. R. Evm. 612.
115. United States v. Wilson, 361 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Lutwak, 195
F.2d 748, 754-55 (7th Cir. 1952).
116. For cases and statutes see Slough, supra note 109, at 7-8. See also former FED. R.
CIv. P. 43 (b).
117. United States v. Lemon, 497 F.2d 854,859 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Gregory,
472 F.2d 484, (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Watson, 450 F.2d 290, 291 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 993 (1972); Bushaw v. United States, 353 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966). Contra, United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1962).
But cf. State v. Skinner, 110 Ariz. 135, 515 P.2d 880 (1973).
118. United States v. Dunmore, 446 F.2d 1214, 1220-1221 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1041 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 427 F.2d 957, 960-961 (5th Cir. 1970); C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 38, at 76 (2d ed. 1972); Slough, supra note 109, at 11-12.
119. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 904(8) (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Slough, supra note 109,
at 11 (1958). However, once the court has determined that a party has shown damage, and,
thereafter, allows that party not only to impeach the witness by a prior inconsistent statement, but also to introduce extrinsic evidence as to the statement, the jury will more than
likely give the prior inconsistent statement substantive effect notwithstanding any limiting
instruction to the contrary. See note 84 supra.
120. Slough, supra note 109, at 11; see, e.g., State v. Pope, 215 S.E.2d 139 (N.C. 1975);
Patterson v. State, 342 A. 2d 660 (Md. 1975) (to show why the witness was called).
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helpful hypothetical example. Assume that a party offers a witness
who takes the stand and declares that he cannot remember making
an unsworn statement to a police officer. The party offers a second
witness who testifies to events that are identical to the events in the
first witness' unsworn statement. The court, in the hypothetical
situation, is faced with a dilemma. It could allow the first witness'
unsworn statement for only 'impeachment, in which case the jury
would be totally confused because of the substantive evidence that
would be introduced through the second witness. 2 ' In the alternative, the court could refuse to allow the first witness to be impeached, thereby clearly rejecting the congressional intent of rule
607 to eliminate all obstacles in the way of a party who wanted to
impeach his own witness.12
When Congress amended the Senate/Supreme Court version of
rule 801(d)(1)(A), it failed to fully analyze the operational relationship between rules 607 and 801(d)(1)(A). The confusion resulting
from the incongruity of the two rules was blatant in United States
2 3 Nancy Willis, a government witness, testified as to
v. Jordano.
Jordano's alibi. The government then introduced her inconsistent
grand jury testimony and several inconsistent statements that she
had given to the police. At trial, the grand jury testimony was admitted substantively,' while the statements given to the police
were admitted only for impeachment purposes." 5 The Second Circuit upheld the trial court's decision. A jury is seriously confused
when it is instructed to limit a prior inconsistent statement to impeachment; 26 it is irreparably confused when instructed, especially
in regard to the same issue, to use one prior inconsistent statement
for its substantive effect, but to use several other prior inconsistent
statements only for their impeaching effect.2'
INTERNAL INCONSISTENCY: RULE

801(d)(1)

Internal inconsistency in rule 801(d)(1) also fosters confusion.
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) allowy, as substantive evidence, any statement
122. P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 53 (1973); Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Federal Evidence Rule 607, 56 F.R.D. 183, 266-67 (1972).
121. See text accompanying notes 126-127 infra.
123. 521 F.2d 695 (2nd Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Cunningham, 446 F.2d 194
(2d Cir), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); United States v. Mingoia, 424 F.2d 710 (2d Cir.
1970).
124. 521 F.2d at 697.
125. Id. at 697-98. See also FED. R. EVID. 613; CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
10 (1974).
126. See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
127. See, e.g., United States v.Jordano, 521 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1975).
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consistent with the witness' testimony if that consistent statement
is offered to rebut an express or implied charge of either recent
fabrication, or improper influence or motive.' 28 Whereas rule
801(d)(1)(A) requires that prior inconsistent statements used substantively must have been given under oath at a former proceeding,
rule 801(d)(1)(B) makes no such requirement as to the substantive
use of prior consistent statements. Whether the different result in
the two rules was a drafting oversight 2 9 or a direct intention because
rehabilitative consistent statements are considered less likely to be
abused'30 is irrelevant when considered in light of the problem created by the different admission requirements of the two rules. The
jury will not be able to distinguish between giving substantive effect
to prior rehabilitative consistent statements while giving only impeaching effect to unsworn prior inconsistent statements.' 3 ' The
jury's task will be impossible when a witness, impeached by an
unsworn prior inconsistent statement, is thereafter rehabilitated by
32
a prior consistent statement.'
On October 16, 1975, President Ford signed Senate Bill 1549' 3
which restored to the Federal Rules of Evidence former rule
801(d)(1)(C) of the Supreme Court's version of the rules. Rule
801(d)(1)(C) excludes from hearsay the out of court identification
of a person if the identifying witness is in court subject to crossexamination. 4 In the past, when a witness' prior identification
passed constitutional muster,' 35 federal courts admitted the out of
128. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(1)(B). It should be noted that rule 801(d)(1)(B), unlike Uniform
Rule of Evidence 503(b) or the Model Code of Evidence Rule 63(1), allows the prior consistent
statement only as support in certain situations. Rules 63(1) and 503(b), which have permitted
all prior statements of a witness as substantive evidence, might have lead to abuse because
many parties might have cluttered their cases with prior statements. But see FED. R. EvIn.
403.
129. A drafting oversight seems unlikely because there was at least one proposal that
would have required both prior inconsistent statements and prior rehabilitative statements
to have been under oath at a former proceeding. 1973 Hearings,supra note 7, at 94-95 (Supp.)
(letter from Herbert E. Hoffman, Counsel, Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws).
130. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-99;
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 251, at 604 (2d ed. 1972); Reutlinger, supra note 30, at 366-67.
Basically, the theory is that the opposing party, who has opened the door to the admission of
the rehabilitative statements, should not complain because the rehabilitative statements are
no different than that to which the witness presently testifies.
131. Blakey, supra note 87, at 626.
132. Evans, Article Eight of the FederalRules of Evidence: The Hearsay Rule, 8 VAL. U.L.
REV. 261, 272-273 (1974).
133. Act of October 16, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-113, 89 Stat. 576.
134. Id.
135. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969);
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
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court identification as an exception to the hearsay rule.' 3 6However,
the most important factor in causing Congress to reinstate rule
801(d)(1)(C) was the reliability of prior identifications compared
with in-court identifications. Congress placed great importance on
the prior identification being fresher in the witness' memory.'37 It
was incongruous, therefore, for Congress to have reinstated rule
801(d)(1)(C) on the basis of the fresher memory rationale without
also having reinstated the Supreme Court's version of rule
801(d)(1)(A).' 35 Moreover, any prior identifications admitted under
rule 801(d)(1)(C) are not conditioned upon any requirement of impeachment or support, nor are the prior identifications required to
have been given under oath at a former proceeding. Therefore, as
in the situations involving rules 801(d)(1)(A) and (B), further problems of conflicting, confusing jury instructions will arise.
The requirements in rule 801(d)(1)(A) that the prior inconsistent
statement be "given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at
a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition," although
arguably akin to corroboration because they provide an assurance
of reliability, will no more insure that a single prior inconsistent
statement is sufficient to sustain a verdict than a prior inconsistent
statement not meeting those requirements. The general rule is that
former testimony may be proved by the testimony of any person who
was present and heard it given.' Therefore, if there is a dispute as
to whether a prior inconsistent statement was made, it would make
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). A detailed
discussion of the constitutional standards of prior identifications is outside the scope of this
article. See generally Comment, PreindictmentIdentification Confrontation Held Not to Be
a CriticalStage of the Prosecution Where the Accused's Right to Counsel Attaches, 4 Loy.
CI. L.J. 213 (1973).
136. United States v. Lincoln, 494 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Shannon,
424 F. 2d 476 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 844 (1970); United States v. Anderson, 406 F.2d
719 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 967 (1969); S. REP. No. 94-355, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3

(1975).
137. S. REP. No. 94-355, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975). But see Buckhout, Eyewitness
Testimony, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, December, 1974, at 23. See also United States v. Brown,
501 F.2d 146, 150-51 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding the refusal of the trial court to accept the
expert testimony of Dr. Buckhout as to the problems of eyewitness testimony).
138. This is especially so if one operates on the premise that human memory has diminished reliability with spoken words as opposed to physical events. ExtrajudicialStatements,
supra note 61, at 111. For an excellent discussion as to the relationship between prior identifications and prior statements, see Beaver & Biggs, supra note 33, at 329-338.
139. Meyers v. United States, 171 F.2d 800, 812 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 912
(1949); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1290; 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 294-95 (Supp.) (letter from
Judge Albert B. Maris, Chairman, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States); 1974 Hearings, supra note 8, at 66 (Statement
submitted by Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States).
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no difference, in terms of assuring reliability, whether the statement
was proved by the testimony of a grand juror or by the testimony of
a person who heard the statement given while on the street.' 0 Moreover, an unsworn prior inconsistent statement and a sworn prior
inconsistent statement should stand on equal levels of reliability
when the witness who gave the statement acknowledges having
given that statement.'' Finally, one of the principal reasons why
Congress initially rejected the Supreme Court's version of rule
801(d)(1)(C) was the fear that a person could be convicted solely
upon evidence admitted under that rule."' Congress flatly rejected
that fear when it reinstated rule 801(d)(1)(C). 3 Consequently, congressional reinstatement of rule 801(d)(1)(C) suggests that there is
insufficient reason why it should not also adopt the Supreme
Court's version of rule 801(d)(1)(A).
CONCLUSION

The congressional compromise in rule 801(d)(1)(A) not only created many problems that could have been avoided, but also destroyed the practical utility of rule 801(d)(1) (A) as promulgated by
the Supreme Court."' Congress, by restrictively amending rule
801(d)(1)(A), frustrated the intention of the proposed drafts of the
Federal Rules of Evidence which would have liberalized the admission of hearsay in the federal courts. This congressional step back140. In State v. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1973), the court held that a prior inconsistent
statement of a witness given before the grand jury was properly admitted as substantive
evidence at trial when the witness was unable to recollect the statement. Furthermore, the
court indicated that the prior inconsistent statement, which was the only evidence in the
prosecutor's case, would have been enough for a conviction were it not for the defense counsel
relying upon the trial court's ruling that the statement would not be given substantive effect.
The defense counsel's reliance upon the trial court's ruling caused him to advise his client
not to take the stand because the prosecution had no other evidence of the defendant's guilt.
Although the statement in Igoe was before the grand jury, the court did not limit its holding
to only those statements made before the grand jury. Rather, the court held that substantive
effect was to be given to all prior inconsistent statements of witnesses who presently testify
under oath subject to cross-examination.
141. See text accompanying notes 104-105 supra.
142. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974). It is anomalous that the Senate
used the sufficiency theory to strike Supreme Court rule 801(d)(1)(C), and, at the same time,
used that same theory to sustain Supreme Court rule 801(d)(1)(A). S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 n.21 (1974).
143. S. REP. No. 94-355, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1975).
144. 1974 Hearings, supra note 8, at 51 (testimony of Professor Edward W. Cleary, Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, Judicial Conference of the United
States); 1973 Hearings. supra note 7, at 294 (Supp.) (letter from Judge Albert B. Maris,
Chairman, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States).

1977]

Prior Inconsistent Statements

277

ward thwarted the attempt of the Supreme Court to eliminate evidentiary obstacles in the search for truth.'45
145. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 232 (1975); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89
(1970).
146. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & D. BERGER, WEINSTIN's EVIDENCE 801(d)(1)(A)[011, at 801-71
(1975).

